This piece, first published on May 5, 2015, is being republished as part of the Chicago Policy Review’s 20th Anniversary Series. Please visit us to learn more about the series from our Executive Editors. Robert Pape, University of ChicagoRobert Pape is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago specializing in international security affairs. He is the Director of the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism and his current work focuses on the causes of suicide terrorism and the politics of unipolarity. Recent publications include Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It and Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.
Pape is the author of Dying to Win (3.84 avg rating, 533 ratings, 53 reviews, published 2005), Bombing to Win (3.64 avg rating, 140 ratings, 14. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism is Robert Pape's analysis of suicide terrorism from a strategic, social, and psychological point of view. It is based on a database he has compiled at the University of Chicago, where he directs the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism. The book's conclusions are.
His commentary on international security policy has appeared in The New York Times, Washington Post, New Republic, Boston Globe, Los Angeles Times, as well as on Nightline, ABC News, CBS News, CNN, Fox News, and NPR. Before coming to Chicago in 1999, he taught international relations at Dartmouth College and air power strategy for the USAF’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies. Pape received his Ph.D. From the University of Chicago in 1988.Your 2005 book, Dying to Win, documents a number of remarkable findings about suicide terrorism. Who are suicide terrorists, and what are they after?For the most part they’re responding to the military occupation of a community that they care a lot about.I put together the first complete data set of suicide attacks after 9/11. I did that because, like many people who come into suicide terrorism, I thought I was going to figure out when an Islamic fundamentalist goes from being a devout, observant Muslim to somebody who then is suicidally violent.
But there was no data available, so I put together this complete database of suicide attacks around the world from the early 1980s to 2003.I was really struck that half the suicide attacks were secular. I began to look at the patterns and I noticed that they were tightly clustered, both in where they occurred and the timing, and that 95 percent of the suicide attacks were in response to a military occupation.And military occupation matters because it represents not exactly how many soldiers are on a piece of soil, but rather control of the local government, the local economic system, and the local social system. It’s the military occupation of the U.S.
And NATO in Afghanistan that allows us to inform and impose change in women’s rights. And I’m not saying that’s a bad thing; what I’m saying is that when you impose women’s rights at the point of a gun, then that creates a sense in the local community that they’ve lost their self-determination. What you’re seeing with not all, but most, suicide terrorists is a response to loss of self-determination for their local community.Are these tactics effective?They’re more effective than we’d like — not in the sense that the attacks work 100 percent of the time, but they work well for groups that have few alternatives. The average suicide attack kills 10 people, whereas the average non-suicide attack, even in the very same countries, typically kills one person. So they’re tactically effective.They’re also more effective at the political level. Because the idea that where there’s one suicide attacker, there might be many more suicide attackers, can create the threat that one attack will represent future attacks to come.
That has caused big governments to withdraw militarily. In Lebanon in the 1980s, Hezbollah used suicide attacks to cause the United States to abandon its military commitment to Lebanon.
Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Suicide terrorism is rising around the world, but there is great confusion as to why. In this paradigm-shifting analysis, University of Chicago political scientist Robert Pape has collected groundbreaking evidence to explain the strategic, social, and individual factors responsible for.
In October 1983, 241 Marines were killed with the loss of one suicide attacker. Four months later Ronald Reagan pulled out all the American combat troops there, rather than face another suicide attack.Suicide attack has created major political and strategic benefits for groups that don’t have other alternatives. It’s not like they’re choosing a suicide attack over using an army.What’s the mechanism for suicide terrorism to be politically effective? Is it that people in democracies are responding?They don’t want to pay the costs. In Lebanon, Reagan sent the troops in on actually more of a humanitarian mission, to cause stability.
We weren’t after oil. But we were viewed by the local population as essentially the handmaiden of Israel, because Israel had invaded southern Lebanon before. So we were just viewed as another occupier, because we’re Israel’s chief ally. We didn’t have a lot of interests at stake, so with just a small number of attacks — although 241 people dying is pretty big; that’s more than died in the first Gulf War — Reagan decided that the cost-benefit just didn’t add up.The Persian Gulf is a little bit different, because oil is at stake. The Persian Gulf has one-third of the world’s oil; access to that oil matters for the health of our economies. This is why we’ve paid really quite an expensive price with the war in Iraq and so forth, without leaving.Perhaps that answers the question of who really drives counterterrorism policy.
Is it a democratic reaction of the people to risks, or something else?The purpose of terrorism is to cause fear and terror. And what you see after 9/11 is really quite an inordinate amount of fear and terror in the United States with the population, and then also among elites.I think that we now live in a calmer political environment. With ISIS, I’m not saying there are no elements of fear or terror that exist — the beheadings and the burning of the Jordanian pilot certainly evoke that — but if you look at the range of serious debate about strategy for how to deal with ISIS, it’s operating within a very narrow band. Obama is using a strategy that is called “offshore balancing,” where you use over-the-horizon air power and naval power and empower local groups to support that policy. His critics — like Lindsey Graham and John McCain — argue for a slight variance of that, but not for a deployment of 100,000 ground troops. We don’t live in a political world where Republicans are going to say they agree with Obama, but if you look at the substantive differences, they’re pretty narrow.Speaking of ISIS and information, what is your reaction to, “What ISIS Really Wants”?I think it’s just wrong.
The author Graeme Wood is painting a picture of ISIS as all religious, all the time. Interestingly in the second section he is talking about how the main difference with Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda is that ISIS really wants territory.Wanting territory means there’s a community that wants a state. ISIS, and most suicide groups, are driven by an ideal of nationalism; they want to control their destiny with a state. ISIS is composed of a leadership of about 25 people, which is one-third very heavily religious, for sure; one-third former Saddam Hussein military officers who are Baathists, who are secular; and one-third who are Sunni militia, Sunni tribal leaders. That just conveniently is lost in the Wood piece.It’s definitely the case that ISIS wants to kill people who are not part of its community. But this is normal in nationalist groups.
(Hutu wanted to kill Tutsi; they also wanted to kill moderate Hutu who didn’t want to kill Tutsi.)What is next for ISIS?Obama is using a strategy called “,” which is this over-the-horizon strategy that I actually called for in Dying to Win, and then I called for again in Cutting the Fuse in 2010. It makes a lot of sense if what you’re dealing with are nationalist groups, like I’m claiming. Because then you can try to not make the matter worse by pouring in ground forces. Ground forces are going to make however much anger or terrorism there is worse, which is why when we invaded and conquered Iraq, we produced the largest suicide campaign in history.ISIS took Mosul because Mosul is Sunni. ISIS is Sunni. You had the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad with military forces in Mosul.
But those are controlled by Shia; even if the foot soldiers are Sunni, the command is Shia. The command wouldn’t fight and die for Mosul, because it’s not the territory of the Shia. So it was a piece of cake; there was no battle for Mosul. ISIS simply drove in, and the other people drove out.Then there was a question of whether ISIS would threaten Erbil, which is populated by Kurds, or Baghdad, which are Shia.
Those are much tougher for ISIS to take anyway, and what we did is use air power to contain that threat, and then roll back ISIS. We also worked with local allies —the Kurds and the Shia — to roll back ISIS.Now we only can roll them back so far by working with Kurds and Shia, because ISIS is mainly a Sunni movement.
So if it’s a Sunni revolt, then the real thing we need, if we want to roll it back further, is not have the Shia sit on top of the Sunnis, or the Kurds sit on top of the Sunnis, because that’s more occupation. We need to try and find some Sunni alternatives to ISIS like the Anbar Awakening that we used to have.ISIS has a fearsome methodology. But what’s the actual threat?It’s medium in the region. The threat to the United States is real, but it’s low. It’s more likely to be lone-wolf style attacks that look like the Boston Marathon bombing than 9/11. You can have sophisticated local attacks if the local population isn’t paying any attention. Before 9/11, Mohammed Atta and three other guys took flight lessons here, lessons where they didn’t want to learn how to land, and nobody thought that was weird because nobody could imagine anything.
Well, if somebody wanted to do anything like that now, we would all know in a heartbeat that was weird, right?In Iraq and Syria, in the Sunni areas, you do have some complicated attacks that are planned and carried out, where a suicide attack is combined with three or four other pieces. You can do that because the local Sunni populations are mostly supporting, in at least a passive way, what’s occurring.We talk a lot about terrorism threats from the Middle East.
What about the rest of the world?We talk a lot about the Middle East because after the end of the Cold War, the United States stationed an army in the Persian Gulf, which we had not done going back to World War II. And there was no counterweight from the Soviet Union to prevent us from stationing the army there. So Saddam invaded Kuwait, and then we decided — and 35 other countries went along — to kick Saddam out of Kuwait. It was to protect access to oil.When we did that in March 1991, we didn’t leave. That army stayed there, because we’re “hedging,” right?
Well that hedging means we’re in control, or certainly viewed as in control. Al Qaeda, bin Laden, argued from the get-go that this would prevent there ever being a new regime to come in Riyadh.
What he wanted was a much more Islamic regime, religious regime, but as he saw it a regime that reflected community self-determination. Well you can’t do that if the Americans have all these military troops stationed there to prevent exactly that kind of a change. You see what I mean?The reason we’re talking about the Middle East isn’t because we’re just obsessing about Middle Eastern politics. It’s because with the end of the Cold War, that really was the new place we put forces where we hadn’t put them before.Any general prescriptions for things the U.S. Should be doing differently in foreign policy?I think it’s really tragic that Obama can’t seem to come up with rhetoric to describe his policy.
He is a great communicator. And even in the White House’s February 2015 he did a good job with the rhetoric of talking about the political causes of terrorism.But in the New York Times, there was recently where he sat down with Obama. And you’ll see, it’s all about his policy, and they’re not able to come up with a name. Apparently he just won’t take “offshore balancing,” but that’s what it is. You can call it “over the horizon,” but it’s really difficult if you sort of don’t have a name, or a set of concepts, that really explain your policy.So I think the number one thing is that the President’s power comes in large part because of his ability to articulate a coherent policy. I think it’s quite coherent — he just hasn’t articulated it.Back to democratic mechanisms, what is the role of the average person in influencing foreign policy?It can actually be pretty big. It really is the case that grassroots organizing is listened to and paid attention to by politicians.
What we have been missing are real efforts to try and have grassroots organizations around issues of foreign policy. I think that the Republicans, with the rise of Fox News and Republican talk radio, have done an amazing job of basically building some of those, and the Democratic side have not done as much.So what can an ordinary person do? It’s basically looking for ways to participate in grassroots organizations. And one of the things to do is to talk about new arguments and new ideas. Within six degrees of separation, each of us knows everybody in the world. So if people who read your piece will just tell two or three other people, and then ask them to talk to two or three other people, that will do a lot more good than they might realize.
Robert Pape Bombing To Win
It’s actually a lot more powerful than people think, and it is the way to go forward.Feature Photo: cc/.
Notable credit(s), with James K. FeldmanWebsiteRobert Anthony Pape Jr. (born April 24, 1960) is an American known for his work on international security affairs, especially the coercive strategies of and the rationale of. He is currently a professor of Political Science at the and founder and director of the (CPOST). In early October 2010, the University of Chicago press released Pape's third book, co-authored with James K. Feldman, Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It. Contents.Career Pape graduated and in 1982 from the, where he was a Harry S Truman Scholar from the state of Pennsylvania, majoring in political science, and earned his Ph.D.
From the in 1988 in the same field. During his doctoral program he was a for a class taught by the high-profile international relations scholar. He taught international relations at from 1994 to 1999 and air power strategy at the 's from 1991 to 1994.
Since 1999, he has taught at the, where he is now tenured. In the past he has done significant work on coercive air power. He defines the focus of his current work as 'the causes of suicide terrorism and the politics of unipolarity.'
In addition to his research and teaching duties, Pape has been the director of the graduate studies department of political science as well as the chair of the at the University of Chicago. Since 1999 he has co-directed the Program on International Security Policy with Mearsheimer, and since 2004 he has directed CPOST.CPOST After presenting preliminary data on his research into suicide terrorism in the in 2003, Pape founded the, which he directs. The project is funded by the, the 's, the University of Chicago, and the.On December 22, 2009, Pape's Chicago Project on Security and Threats (CPOST) launched its. The website contains a portion of Pape's suicide terrorism database as well as work by Pape and other members of the CPOST community.Also in December 2009, published an issue on terrorism featuring content exclusively from the CPOST community.
In addition editing the volume, Pape contributed the essay, outlining the current state of terrorism research, the issue included contributions from Nichole Argo, Risa Brooks, Jenna Jordan, and Lindsey A. O'Rourke.Politics During the, Pape served as an adviser to both. Publications Books Bombing to Win Pape published his first full-length book in 1996, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. In it, Pape questions the conventional wisdom that coercive air power is both effective and relatively cheap. Rather than coercing citizens of the bombed nation to rise up against their government, coercive air power often backfires, resulting in a citizenry that is both surprisingly resilient and loyal to their government.Pape also argues that air power and land power should be integrated and used together in a ' fashion. In Pape's model, enemy land forces faced with both air and land power will be forced to either mass and therefore be vulnerable to attack from the air, or will be forced to scatter and therefore be vulnerable to being mopped up by land power. Pape cites certain battles in as examples of a hammer and anvil approach.
Elsewhere, Pape has continued his criticisms of the idea that wars can be won through air power alone. In his book, Pape denies can have strategic effect under any circumstances.
Who Is Robert A Pape
He argues that the use of air power for punishment, that is, attacking civilian and economic targets (such as in or the of in 1945), has almost universally failed in targets. Instead, Pape suggests that successful usage of air power has come when it is used against conventional military targets and denies the target the ability to achieve their aims (such as in ).A 1999 funded by the 'explored the role of air power as a coercive instrument', attempting to rebut Pape's claim. They concluded that, 'Although the United States and the USAF have scored some notable successes, the record is mixed.'
Horowitz and Reiter applied 'multivariate probit analysis to all instances of air power coercion from 1917 to 1999'. Their quantitative analyses essentially matched Pape's qualitative assessment that attacking military targets has improved the chances of success, but 'higher levels of civilian vulnerability have no effect on the chances of coercion success'.Pape has been criticized by who insist his arguments are selective. Pape denies that the German, the and even (after the event) had strategic effect. Other experts claim the operations had rapidly forced the Dutch, Yugoslavs, and Serbs into capitulation. Dying to Win Pape's (2005) contradicts many widely held beliefs about suicide. Based on an analysis of every known case of suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2003 (315 attacks as part of 18 campaigns), he concludes that there is 'little connection between suicide terrorism and, or any one of the world's religions.
Rather, what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland' (p. 4). 'The taproot of suicide terrorism is nationalism,' he argues; it is 'an extreme strategy for national liberation' (pp. 79–80). Pape's work examines groups such as the to the. Pape also notably provides further evidence to a growing body of literature that finds that the majority of suicide terrorists do not come from impoverished or uneducated backgrounds, but rather have middle class origins and a significant level of education.In a criticism of Pape's link between occupation and suicide terrorism, an article titled 'Design, Inference, and the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism' (published in The American Political Science Review), authors Scott Ashworth, Joshua D. Clinton, Adam Meirowitz, and Kristopher W. Ramsay from Princeton charged Pape with 'sampling on the dependent variable' by limiting research only to cases in which suicide terror was used. In response, Pape argues that his research design is sufficient because it collected the universe of known cases of suicide terrorism.
In a rejoinder, Ashworth et al. Discuss how even large samples of the dependent variable cannot be used to explain variation in outcomes, why suicide terrorism in some places but not others, if the sample does not vary. Has also criticized Pape's conclusions. Cutting the Fuse Pape's Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It is co-authored with James K. Feldman, a defense policy analyst who formerly taught at the Air Force Institute of Technology. Retrieved 2017-02-08. ^.
Washington Post, July 10, 2005; D01. (2008-05-05),. ^ Pape, Robert, Bombing to Win, p. 314. Byman, Waxman, and Larson (1999).
Byman, Waxman, and Larson (1999, p. Iii, 5/195). Horowitz, Michael; (2001), Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45 (2): 147–173,:, retrieved July 29, 2013., Volume 102, Issue 02, May 2008, pp 269-273., Volume 102, Issue 02, May 2008, pp 275-277. Design, Inference, and the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism: A Rejoinder, Draft Manuscript,. Moghadam, Assaf (2006). 'Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and the Globalization of Martyrdom: A Critique ofDying to Win'. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism.
29: 707–729. ^, Volume 22, Issue 2, Fall 1997, pp 90-136., Volume 23, Issue 1, Summer 1998, pp 66-77.
^, Volume 23, Issue 1, Summer 1998, pp 50-65., Volume 53, Issue 4, Autumn 1999, pp 631-668.References.;; Larson, Eric (1999), (PDF), Project AIR FORCE, RAND Corporation, retrieved July 29, 2013External links. at the. on.